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We document some recent changes in the market for loan sales. 
We use a Tobit model to characterize the determinants of loan sales 
and purchases by banks, relating quantities bought and sold to bank 
size, capital, risk, and fbnding mode.  The results, though not 
definitive, broadly confirm the Pennacchi model of sales.  Other 
data cast doubt on the importance of mergers and acquisitions for 
this market and on the comparability of different data sources. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmI.  INTRODUCTION 
A revolution now challenges the very essence of traditional banking:  making and booking 
loans.  Increasingly, banks both large and small sell their commercial and industrial loans.  These 
sales take place without a guarantee from the government or the bank, and without being bundled 
into securities.  The ramifications of a closely held asset becoming a marketable security oblige 
bank managers, regulators, and policymakers to rethink the role banks play in the economy and 
the role government plays in the banking sector. 
The emerging loan sales market can illuminate a number of issues.  It offers a chance to 
observe a new market developing in  a regulated industry whose reporting requirements guarantee 
a wealth of data not usually available. It provides a laboratory for studying the origination and 
information functions of bank lending, separate from the investment hnction.  From a public 
policy perspective, an understanding of the loan sales market is important in assessing the 
importance and competitiveness of domestic banks.  For example, recent reports on foreign bank 
lending in the United States missed the distinction between loans held and loans originated and 
thereby overstated the involvement of foreign banks. 
To hlly comprehend the implications of loan sales for financial intermediation, we need to 
understand what caused the surge in loan sales.  To what extent have regulations and market 
pressures -- binding capital requirements, the need to diversifjr, or a shift in regional economies -- 
created  the demand and supply?  Moreover, have hndamental changes in institutions and 
information technology allowed the loan sale to become a feasible contract, and thus a suitable 
solution for these problems? 
The answers to these questions will determine whether loan sales are here to stay, or 
whether they represent an epiphenomenon on the financial scene, their market vulnerable to a shiR 
in regulation or leverage policy.  Even accepting the hypothesis of a shiR in information 
technology leaves many open questions.  On the one hand, a technology that makes bank loans 
marketable may lead to disintermediation. The number of loans with which banks have a special 
advantage declines as the supply of nonmarketable assets dwindles.  On the other hand, the 
technology may allow banks to make and book loans that even they previously found too 
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different assets. 
While the ultimate goal of this research is to understand the factors that drive the loan 
sales market, the present paper has a much more modest goal.  We aim to characterize the 
determinants of loan sales and purchases by banks, and thus to understand the importance of size, 
capital, and hnding mode in the decision to buy and sell loans.  We hope this work serves as a 
foundation for more advanced studies that more directly confront the basic issues of why the loan 
sale is a credible contract and how shifts in information technology, regulatory practice, and 
market forces influence the market.  Still, by digging into the details we can begin to answer these 
questions. We can find out how bank size and capital affect loan sales, and how important 
"informationally special" transactions -- such as sales of well-collateralized merger and acquisition 
loans, or sales to subsidiaries -- are in the market. 
The general strategy of our work is to use the individual bank data from the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council's Quarterly Reports of Income and Condition (call 
reports) to estimate the determinants of loan sales and purchases.  We supplement these results by 
examining other data sources, such as the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan OEcer Opinion Survey 
and Weekly Reporting Banks series.  The sample period includes the recent recession and the 
downturn in the loan sales market and thus provides an opportunity to take a deeper look at these 
issues.  One distinguishing feature of our work on the econometric side is the use of Tobit 
analysis.  This has the advantage of explicitly taking into account the many banks that do not sell 
(or buy) loans, without ignoring the information about the volume of those who do participate. Its 
disadvantage is that correcting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation is more difficult. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows:  Section I1 describes the basic institutional details 
of the loan sales market.  The difference between selling loans and selling stocks and bonds lies 
behind the theoretical and empirical issues addressed in sections I11 and IV.  Section I11 presents 
a quick overview of a theory we use to organize our thoughts on the market, and section IV, the 
' More detailed information appears in Haubrich (1989), Gorton and Haubrich (1990), and Gorton (1991). 
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appear in section V. 
n. THE LOAN SALES MARKET 
A bank sells a loan by  promising its payment stream to the buyer.  In the most common 
type of loan sale, the participation, the original contract between the bank and the borrower 
remains in place, and the bank continues to collect payments, oversee the collateral, and examine 
the books.  In many cases (termed silent participations), the borrower does not even know that 
the loan has been sold.  A less common but still important type of loan sale, the assignment, 
transfers the debtor-creditor relationship to the buyer, giving the buyer some rights to take direct 
action against the borrower.  Assignments do not completely remove the original bank from the 
picture, however, because that bank may retain obligations, such as loan commitments, to the 
borrower.  The rarest and most complete type of loan sale is the novation.  Like the sale of a 
stock or bond, a novation completely transfers all rights and obligations of the selling bank to the 
buyer; the originator leaves the picture entirely. 
Two legal and accounting issues shape the loan sales market.  Banks want to remove the 
loan from their balance sheet and also desire to avoid federal securities laws.  To remove the loan 
from the balance sheet, and ti-eat the transaction as an asset sale rather than a borrowing, the bank 
must show that the risk of the loan has been shifted to the buyer.  This means that the entire loan 
must be sold off, that the seller bank can provide no recourse to the buyer, and that the loan must 
be sold to maturity.  (For more detail, see Morris [1991] or Gorton and Haubrich [1990].) 
Banks also hope to avoid having loan sales classified as securities, thereby sidestepping 
federal securities regulation and the associated disclosure laws, reporting requirements, and 
increased legal penalties.  In addition, they hope to stay clear of any brush with the Glass-Steagall 
prohibitions against underwriting securities. The courts have generally held that loan sales are not 
securities, in part because banks have taken pains to structure the contracts properly. For 
example, loans are rarely resold because such a resale would make the loan look too much like a 
security. 
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nine major banks.  As of January 25, 1993, the total balance outstanding for this group was 
$58 billion, of which $5 billion was in loans with maturities under a year, and $53 billion was in 
loans with maturities of one year or more.  Maturity has increased as the market has developed. 
In the early 1980s, banks mainly sold short-term (under 90 days) domestic commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans made to investment-grade (BBB or better) borrowers. Since then, maturity 
has lengthened and loans to lower-quality borrowers have predominated.  Among large banks, the 
share of outstanding loans sold that were obligations to investment-grade borrowers dropped to 
37 percent by  1989. 
Loans are bought and sold by many types of banks, though large banks, both foreign and 
domestic, predominate.  Nonbank (and even noniinancial) firms also buy loans, which results in 
some loans leaving the banking system entirely.  Loan purchases by foreign banks and nonbank 
firms limit the scope of our empirical results, which depend on the bank call reports, and so are 
restricted to domestic banks and insured domestic ofices of foreign banks.  Table 1 lists the top 
25 domestic sellers and buyers of loans.  Though large banks figure prominently in both panels, 
they dominate less on the purchase side. 
The final notable aspect of this market is its pricing structure. Prices of highly rated loans 
closely track commercial paper and LIBOR. Not surprisingly, yields on lower-rated loans show a 
greater spread. Asset Sales Report (February 1, 1993) lists the spread between the 30-day Alp1 
loan sales yield and commercial paper as -2 basis points, showing that short-term loans can even 
sell at a premium to commercial paper.  For loans with the lower rating of A2P2, the spread was 
18 basis points. 
nI.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
As a basic framework to think about the issues surrounding loan sales, we use a simplified 
version of the model developed by Pennacchi (1  988).2  This model is a state-preference version of 
the Miller (1977) debt model as extended to banks by Orgler and Taggart (1983).  Corporate 
For a somewhat different approach, see Mester (1992) or Carlstrom and Samolyk (1993). 
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providing a determinate debt-to-equity ratio. 
In this version of the model, the bank adds value by providing monitoring services.  If it 
- 
monitors a loan at level a=a, the loan will not default and will provide a certain return of (l+rn). 
- 
If the bank monitors at a level below a,  then the loan defaults with certainty. 
Apart from selling loans, banks have two sources of fbnds:  deposits and equity.  Deposits 
have a tax advantage in that their interest is deductible as a business expense, but they have an 
additional cost of reserve requirements.  Banks have a constraint on these fbnding sources, 
namely, a capital requirement that the debt (that is, deposit) to equity ratio not exceed a limit c. If 
we denote the return on deposits as rd  and the return on equity as re, the marginal cost of raising 
funds internally, q,  is given by 
where t is the corporate tax rate and p is the reserve requirement.  Without loan sales, the bank 
makes loans until the return on the loan, net of monitoring costs, equals the cost of fbnds needed 
- 
to fund the loan, or  q=rn- ca  . 
Loan sales introduce a new fbnding possibility.  The bank can now make a loan and sell a 
fraction b of it.  This sold fraction is removed from the bank's balance sheet and is, in effect, 
funded by the loan buyer.  Pennacchi calculates the cost of fbnding a sold loan as 
where b  denotes the fraction of the loan sold.  It is assumed that this fraction is small enough so 
that the bank retains an incentive to monitor the loan. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how this model explains loan sales and loan purchases.  In each 
case, banks have some degree of local market power in both loans and deposits, reflected in a 
downward-sloping demand curve for loans and an upward-sloping deposit supply curve. Banks 
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loans when they have a large supply of funding relative to their loan opportunities. 
Figure 1 is for a bank that sells loans.  The supply of loans, locus NAN',  slopes downward 
until point A.  At  this point,  local loans become less profitable than money-market investments 
paying a return rm.  Likewise, raising core deposits is cheaper than the cost of purchasing hnds in 
the competitive national deposit market.  Consequently, the deposit supply curve DSD' rises until 
rd'rm,  after which the cost of internal funds remains a constant q,  where q is given by equation 
(I)  with rd set to rm. 
Loans are sold in the national market and the bank is a price-taker in the loan sales market. 
This means that all loans sold are priced to yield the market rate of return, rm, to the buyer.  The 
implicit price of finding the fraction b of each loan sold is therefore rm. Hence, when the price 
of internal funds is below rm, the bank holds the loans it originates. When the price of internal 
finds rises above rm, however, selling loans is profitable because it enables the bank to lower the 
-  - 
cost of funding the loan fiom q to b rm+ (I-b )q. The bank makes loans until supply and demand 
meet (at N*) but it hlly books loans only up to point S; the difference is loan sales. 
Figure 2 shows a bank that buys loans.  The curve NAA' describes lending opportunities, 
and the curve DSD' describes funding opportunities. The bank can fund assets up to point S, but 
it has fewer profitable loan originations and instead resorts to the money market.  Admittedly, it 
will also invest in T-bills, commercial paper, and bankers' acceptances, but some of the investment 
may go to loan purchases. 
In explaining the empirical results of the next section, we will often refer to these diagrams 
to conduct simple comparative static exercises such as changing market interest rates, capital 
levels, or loan demand. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our work in this section has one basic goal.  We hope to characterize the determinants of 
loan sales and purchases -- to find out what determines who buys, who sells, and how much.  We 
pursue this both by estimating an econometric specification of loan sales and purchases using the 
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less formal examination of some specialized data sources. 
While we cannot formally test the relative importance of capital requirements and shifts in 
information technology in the emergence and growth of the loan sales market, our results can 
address the impact of many factors such as bank size, merger and acquisition loans, and sales to 
subsidiaries. 
Our main data source in this endeavor consists of the FFIEC's Quarterly Reports of 
Income and Condition, or call reports.  Our sample starts in March 1984, just after a major 
revision of the reports (which means ignoring one quarter, December 1983, of loan sales data), 
and ends in December 1992, the latest available quarter. Loan purchases start later, in the first 
quarter of 1988. 
Figure 3 plots the aggregate level of loan sales and purchases.  Figure 4 plots sales and 
purchases as a percentage of net loans. Note the explosion in the loan sales market between 1986 
and 1988, and the subsequent collapse from 1989 to 1991. Loan purchases, though much smaller 
than sales, remained fairly steady over the entire period.  The relatively small volume of purchases 
serves as a reminder that not only domestic banks purchase loans. 
A. Call Report Data 
The empirical work using the call reports runs the dependent variable, loan sales or loan 
purchases, against a set of independent variables that proxy for individual bank characteristics and 
market conditions.  We first use the entire available sample for loan sales and purchases.  Next, 
we use a more restricted time period for which we have data on off-balance-sheet items and on 
highly leveraged transactions.  This gives us more explanatory variables but a shorter time period. 
To provide a benchmark case, we first run ordinary least squares.  While the parameter 
estimates are all very significant, the R~ is extremely low.  The low R~ is not all that surprising 
because many banks do not sell loans; of the 477,000 observations, 294,000 had no loan sales. 
To correct econometrically for the large number of zero observations for the dependent 
variable requires the use of a limited dependent variable method.  We use Tobit, instead of logit or 
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bought).3 Figure 5 shows the importance of this distinction. The variation in sales comes not 
from changes in the number of banks selling loans but rather in the volume of loans sold by banks 
in the market. 
Loan Sales 
In the loan sales equations, the dependent variable, LSRAT (the ratio of loans sold to total 
assets), is regressed against 19 independent variables.  Definitions of the variables used in the 
study can be found in table 2.  Five of these are dummy variables for size to control for different 
size classes of banks.  Another five dummy variables indicate the banks' regional location 
(Southeast, Midwest, High Plains, Southwest and West).  Seven variables (Caprat, Hotrat, 
Holdco, Ttass, Chrrat, Nlrat, Netimarg) are introduced to proxy for individual bank 
characteristics. These variables capture banks' size, capital position, use of the national money 
market, and position on lending.  They act as a natural starting place for an examination of the 
determinants of loan sales.  Two other variables, Tsprd and Baasprd, are included to proxy for 
general market conditions.  Table 3 presents the results. 
What do the Tobit estimates tell us?  Bank size, measured by total assets, has a positive 
effect on loans sold.  The coefficients on the size dummies and on the log of total assets are 
negative and significant.  The size dummies indicate a positive relationship between size and loan 
sales. However, the negative coefficient on Ttass suggests that the relationship between loan 
sales and size is highly nonlinear.  That is, while large banks sell a higher percentage of their loans 
than do small banks, within a particular size class the larger you become, the fewer loans you sell. 
A bank's geographic location also appears to influence loan sales.  Other things being 
equal, banks located in the Northeast region (the Boston, New York, and Philadelphia Federal 
Reserve Districts) were the least likely to sell loans, and banks in the High Plains states were the 
most likely to do so.  However, it is not clear what is driving the regional variation in loan sales. 
The weakness in the loan sales market in the Northeast should not be attributed to a high bank 
failure rate because the dummy for the Southwest, another high-failure area, came in large and 
For other interesting approaches, see Pave1 and Phillis (1987) and Berger and Udell(1992). 
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sectors. The coefficient on the Midwest dummy is seven times larger than on the Southeast 
dummy. 
The higher a bank's capital ratio, the less likely it is to sell loans.  This accords with the 
story told in section 111.  Banks that find the capital constraint binding will find it is cheaper to 
originate and then sell a loan than to keep it on their books.4 For loan sales, the positive 
coefficient on Hotrat is consistent with the theoretical model's prediction that banks with good 
lending opportunities will sell loans. That is, a bank with a large number of profitable lending 
opportunities will fund only a fraction of loans originated in the national money market (beyond 
the kink in the DD' curve of figure I), funding the remainder off its balance sheet through sales. 
Holding-company affiliation is positive and significantly related to loan sales.  This is 
consistent with evidence from the weekly reporting banks, given below, that a nontrivial amount 
of loan sales is made between affiliates of the same holding company.  Moreover, it is consistent 
with the theory in section 111, to the extent that interaffiliate loan sales are used to minimize the 
cost of funding new loans. 
Chrrat, net charge-offs as a percent of assets, has a coefficient that is positive but 
insignificant, both statistically and economically. Therefore, we do not find evidence of a lemons 
market problem associated with loan sales. 
Net loans and leases enter positively, reflecting that a bank with good lending 
opportunities makes a lot of loans, some of which it sells and some of which it keeps on its 
balance sheet. The positive and significant coefficient on the net interest margin supports this 
interpretation, as high margins indicate a bank with a good supply of profitable loans. 
The two spread variables measuring market conditions also have an impact on loan sales. 
The coefficient on Tsprd is negative but not significant at the 5 percent confidence level.  A 
negative coefficient on the term structure spread suggests that with a steep term structure, banks 
find it profitable to fund new, presumably longer-term, loans on their books with funds purchased 
This result is sensitive to the limited dependent variable problem as the sign of Caprat changes when we move 
from OLS to Tobit in order to estimate the model. 
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spread means that risky assets, such as loans, pay a high premium over safer assets, and are thus 
more desirable. 
A natural question at this point is how well the above specification explains the data, or 
how good the fit is.  Tobit regressions do not have a natural goodness-of-fit measure, but it is 
possible to get some idea of how well the Tobit does.  We obtained the predicted values from the 
Tobit equation (following Maddala [1983, section 6.61) for each bank in each quarter.  We 
summed these across banks for each quarter, yielding an aggregate prediction of loan sales 
volume.  Figure 6 plots the results along with the actual volume of loan sales.  Clearly, this 
specification does not explain enough about loan sales to account for the rise and fall of market 
volume. 
Loan Purchases 
The equations for loan purchases are estimated over a shorter sample period because data 
on purchases do not become available until the first quarter of 1988. Table 4 reports the results 
for purchases.  Overall, bank size is inversely related to loan purchases. That is, small banks tend 
to buy more loans than do large ones.  However, rnid-sized banks (between $500 million and 
$5 billion in assets) buy a greater fraction of loans than do either the smallest two size classes or 
the largest class.  As with loan sales, the relationship size has a nonlinear impact on loan 
purchases.  The positive coefficient on Ttass indicates that within size classes there is a positive 
relationship between size and loan purchases.  Regional effects also remain important, and once 
again the High Plains dummy has the largest coefficient, and the implicit Northeast dummy the 
smallest. 
Capital is positive and significantly related to loans bought.  Furthermore, the coefficient 
on Hotrat, the proxy for purchased funds, is negative and significant. In other words, well- 
capitalized banks that can fund new loans with inexpensive local deposits buy loans.  This is 
consistent with the Pennacchi model in section 111. 
Holding-company affiliation is a factor influencing loan purchases.  Other things being 
equal, banks in bank holding companies are more likely to purchase loans than are nonaffiliated 
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loan sales and purchases between affiliates to manage their consolidated balance sheets. 
The negative coefficient on the charge-off ratio argues for a form of comparative 
advantage. A bank adept at managing loans and assessing their value would have low charge-offs 
and would also have a comparative advantage in buying loans.  The positive and significant 
coefficient on Nlrat, the percent of assets invested in loans, is consistent with the "comparative 
advantage" explanation. 
Loan sales are positively related to loan purchases.  This is consistent with a "threshold 
effect," whereby set-up costs and experience in one side of the market bring returns to the other 
side as well.  The net interest margin has a negative impact, as expected, because banks with good 
lending opportunities do not purchase loans.  Finally, unlike loan sales, neither of the market 
condition variables significantly affects loan purchases.  The poor performance of Tsprd and 
Baasprd in the loan purchase equation is consistent with loan purchases being determined by local 
market variables, particularly by relative local lending and fbnding opportunities. 
HLT Subsample Results 
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimation results using the data on off-balance-sheet activity 
and highly leveraged transactions (HLTs), for which data exist only from the third quarter of 1990 
to the fourth quarter of 1992. The differences from the results given in previous tables may partly 
be due to a shorter sample period. 
In the loan sales equation, two parameters change sign.  The capital ratio switches from 
negative to positive.  This may reflect a reputation effect: Buyers prefer loans from stronger, 
better-capitalized banks.  The coefficient on the risk-spread proxy, Baasprd, changes from 
positive to negative.  What may lie behind the change is that over the period for which we have 
data for HLT loans, the loan sales market was in a steep decline, reversing the general growth 
trend over the total period. 
The HLT and off-balance-sheet variables are both positively related to loan sales.  This 
indicates that some banks are taking a "merchant banking" stance, engaging in a variety of high- 
tech finance.  There may be an even more direct relationship.  Because HLT loans may be the type 
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may be important, the small coefficients and insignificant Chi-squared values show that this is by 
no means the only explanation of loan sales. 
In the loan purchases equation, there are a number a notable differences between the HLT 
subsample results and those of the full sample.  First, all size dummies become negative, indicating 
that the largest banks buy the largest proportion of loans. While not significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level, the positive coefficient on the log of total assets confirms the size effect. 
Second, the coefficients on Caprat and Hotrat reverse signs and the positive coefficient on the 
term structure spread is significant. The behavior of these three proxy variables is consistent with 
large banks becoming more active buyers of loans. Larger banks historically hold smaller capital 
cushions, rely more heavily on national money markets for funding, and have lending 
opportunities that are more closely related to market conditions than are those of smaller banks. 
As with loan sales, off-balance-sheet activities and HLT loans are both positively related 
to loan purchases; this relationship is consistent with the "merchant banking" explanation. 
Moreover, the positive sign on Hltrat confirms the Pennacchi model of section 111.  A firm with 
slack local loan demand goes to the national market -- and buys loans and makes HLT loans. 
Data Snooping 
Our Tobit regressions have yielded a number of insights about factors determining bank 
participation in the loan sales market and are largely consistent with the Pennacchi model. 
Unfortunately, however, our empirical specification does a dismal job of capturing the runup and 
subsequent collapse of the market. (See figure 3.) Because one of the purposes of this research is 
to characterize the determinants of loan sales and purchases in order to provide a foundation for 
future research, we attempt to control for two factors that may have influenced the market: the 
1990-91 recession and the impact of Security Pacific and Bankers Trust.  However, this exercise 
falls within the category of data snooping; therefore, caution must be used in interpreting the 
results.5 
For a description of data  snooping and the attendant biases in test results, see Lo  and MacKinlay (1990). 
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bank loans and, in turn, reducing the supply of loans booked for sale.  In figure 1 the effect of the 
recession would be a downward shift in the lending opportunities curve and a rightward shift in 
point S. Given that the recent recession coincided with the peak and subsequent downturn of the 
loan sales market, and given the slow growth of bank credit in the ongoing recovery, controlling 
for the recession could improve the model's fit. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the runup and subsequent collapse of the loan- 
sales market may be due to the behavior of two banks.  The first, Bankers Trust, was a major 
player in this market, especially in the sale of mergers and acquisitions loans; this institution 
effectively exited the market around the time that it peaked.  Security Pacific Bank was a driving 
force in the development and growth of this market.  Security Pacific's asset quality problems, 
which resulted in  its acquisition by Bank of America in April 1992, eliminated it as major player in 
the loan sales market after the market peaked in 1990. 
To investigate the sensitivity of our results to these two factors, we reestimate the full 
sample loan sales equation with a dummy variable for the recession, RECESS, omitting Bankers 
Trust and Security Pacific from the sample.  The results, shown in table 7, are very similar to 
those in table 3. The coefficient on RECESS is negative and significant.  Thus, as expected, the 
1990-91 recession had a negative impact on loan sales.  The only notable difference in the results 
when RECESS is included as a regressor is that the coefficient on Tsprd becomes negative and 
significant.  Moreover, the results' lack of sensitivity to the omission of Bankers Trust and 
Security Pacific suggests that outliers are not driving the results.  Unfortunately, this data- 
snooping specification of the loan sales equation failed to improve the fit of the model. 
B. Supplemental Data 
The Tobit specification using call report data leaves many puzzles unexplained.  Some 
popular and interesting explanations cannot be addressed by call report data and can be evaluated 
only with other data sets which provide their own perspective (and puzzles) on the matter. 
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(M&A) market.  Banks with large chunks of M&A financing had the desire to reduce their 
exposure to any one borrower.  Moreover, because these loans were collateralized senior debt 
and were obligations of large, well-known corporations, the banks also had the ability to sell the 
loans.  As the M&A market dried up, loan sales activity also fell.  Some evidence supports this 
view, as the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (LPS) oRen showed 
that M&A activity accounted for a large share of the loan sales of the reporting banks.  For 
example, respondents to the August 1989 survey reported that 44.5% of loan sales represented 
financing for mergers and acquisitions. 
For the market as a whole, however, merger activity cannot explain the pattern of loan 
sales volume. Figure 7 plots loan sales and total M&A activity (from Mergers and Acquisitions 
magazine).  This series overstates bank activity in the mergers market because banks were not the 
only source of finding.  Even so, the level of M&As is simply too low to account for either the 
rise or the fall of loan sales volume.  A closer look at figure 7 suggests that merger activity could 
have played a major role before 1987, when the market first developed, but not since. 
A comparison of figure 7 with the LPS survey shows that the experience of the survey 
banks does not always extend to the entire market.  In this case, the concentration of M&A loans 
among survey banks is an aberration. 
The mergers explanation appeals partly because it solves the contracting problem at the 
heart of the market by positing that sold loans are really very close to marketable securities. A 
related possibility is that it is not the nature of the loan itself that solves this problem, but rather 
the relationship between the buyej and the seller.  Specifically, a sale to a subsidiary avoids many 
informational problems.  The weekly reporting banks provide data on this point.  Figure 8 plots 
loan sales of weekly reporting banks from 1984 to the present, along with loans sold to nonbank 
subsidiaries. One more note of caution:  The pattern of sales for this sample of banks does not 
match that of the total market, so that the large weekly reporting banks are not representative of 
the entire market.  Nonetheless, for this subset, sales to nonbank subsidiaries make up a large, and 
reasonably steady, fraction of all loans sold. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmThe weekly reporting banks present their own puzzles.  Why did the bottom drop out of 
the market in  1990? Is there any connection to the LPS survey, in which respondents reported 
that loan sales dropped from 56 in  1990 to 17 in  1991, only to rebound to 57 in 1992? 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Loan sales are a phenomenon in modern finance that signals a change in the role of banks 
as intermediaries. To fblly comprehend the ramifications of the marketability of bank loans for 
banks, for bank regulation, and for the role of federal deposit insurance, one must understand the 
forces that drive the loan sales market.  As a first cut at addressing the relative influences of 
technological change, legal and institutional factors, and bank regulation on the development and 
growth of this market, we look at the determinants of loan sales and purchases by banks. 
We find that bank size, capitalization, fbnding strategy, and investment strategy are all 
significant determinants of loan sales and loan purchases.  Other bank-specific factors such as 
location, holding-company affiliation, and participation in the mergers and acquisitions market, as 
well as general credit-market condition variables, influence loan sales and purchases.  Overall, the 
empirical results support the theoretical (Pennacchi) model of loan sales and purchases presented 
in section 111. 
Unfortunately, however, many issues remain unresolved.  Our empirical model is not able 
to explain the sharp rise of the market at the end of the 1980s and its equally sharp decline in the 
early 1990s. In addition, call report data do not give us a good handle on the extent to which this 
market is used by bank holding companies to minimize fbnding costs for bank loans.  Interaffiliate 
sales and purchases of loans may paint a very different picture of this market and its implications 
for bank-intermediated credit.  Finally, while our results indicate that capital is an important 
determinant of loan sales, we cannot separate the relative influences of capital regulation and 
market forces, as well as technology, on the development and growth of the loan sales market. 
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Table 1 
Top 25 Domestic Sellers and Buyers of Loans 
Citibank NA 
Bank of America NT&SA 
Chemical Bk 
Mellon Bk NA 
Morgan Guaranty TC of NY 
Chase Manhattan Bk NA 
First NB of Chicago 
Crestar Bk 
Signet Bk - VA 
Bank of Tokyo TC 
Wachovia Bk N Carolina 
Texas Commerce Bk NA 
Corestates Bk NA 
Continental Bk NA 
Bank of New York 
Wachovia Bk GA NA 
First Interstate B  k CA 
Bankers TC 
LaSalle NB 
Security Pacific Nat. TC 
First Union NB NC 
First NB of Boston 
Trust Co Bk 
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Rank  BankName 
Connecticut NB 
Nationsbank NC NA 
Bankers TC 
JP Morgan Delaware 
Shawrnut Bk NA 
Chemical Bk 
Central Bk NA 
Bank of America NT&SA 
Huntington NB 
Rhode Island Hosp TR NB 
Trust Co. of New Jersey 
Nationsbank of FL NA 
National Westminster Bk U 
Crestar Bk 
Pittsburgh NB 
Bank of Hawaii 
Texas Commerce Bk NA 
First NB of Boston 
Old Kent B&TC 
Maryland NB 
Comerica Bk 
First Union NB FL 
National City Bk 
Nationsbank TX NA 





Source:  Call reports. 













The ratio of loans sold to total assets. 
The ratio of loans purchased to total assets. 
Dummy variable for banks located in the Southeast region. Equals 1 if the bank is 
in the Richmond or Atlanta Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for banks located in the Midwest region. Equals 1 if the bank is in 
the Cleveland, Chicago, or St. Louis Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for banks located on the High Plains region. Equals 1 if the bank 
is in the Minneapolis or Kansas City Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for banks located in the Southwest region. Equals 1 if the bank is 
in the Dallas Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for banks located in the West region. Equals 1 if the bank is in the 
San Francisco Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for size.  Equals 1 if total assets are less than $50 million, and 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable for size.  Equals 1 if total assets are between $50 million and 
$100 million, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable for size.  Equals 1 if total assets are between $100 million and 
$500 million, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable for size.  Equals 1 if total assets are between $500 million and 
$1 billion, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable for size.  Equals 1 if total assets are between $1 and $5 billion, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variables for the 1990-91 recession. 
The ratio of bank capital to total assets. 
The ratio of "hot" hnds to total assets, that is, deposits above $100,000, brokered 
deposits, foreign deposits, and Fed hnds purchased. 










Table  2 
Variable Definitions (continued) 
The log of total assets. 
The ratio of total charge-offs net of recoveries (a measure of losses on loans) to 
total assets. 
The ratio of net loans and leases to total assets. 
The net interest margin of the bank:  total interest income less total interest costs, 
all divided by total assets. 
The spread between 30 year T-bonds and 90 day T-bills at the beginning of each 
quarter. 
The spread between Standard & Poor's Baa bond portfolio and 90 day T-bills. 
The ratio of off-balance-sheet activities, exclusive of loan sales, to total assets. 
The ratio of loans for highly leveraged transactions to total assets. 
Source:  Authors. 
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Loan Sales, Full Sample 
A.  Tobit Results 
Noncensored Values = 182,762 
Left Censored Values = 294,079 
Observations with Missing Values = 4 
Log Likelihood for Normal - 130948.8  1  1 
























Loan Sales, Full Sample (continued) 
B.  Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Source  DF  Sum of  Mean  F Value  Prob>F 
Squares  Square 
Model  19  34.7539  1.82915  75.377  0.0001 
Error  47682 1  1  1570.8790  0.02427 
C Total  476840  11605.6329 
Root MSE  0.15578  R-Square  0.0030 
DEP Mean  0.0083 1  Adj R-Sq  0.0030 
C.V.  1875.5726 
Variable  Parameter  Standard  T for HO:  Prob>ll'J 





















Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Loan Purchases, Full Sample 
A.  Tobit Results 
Noncensored Values = 77,199 
Left Censored Values = 17  1.80  1 
Observations with Missing Values = 0 
Log Likelihood for Normal  -6989  1.92992 

























Loan Purchases, Full Sample (continued) 
B.  Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Source  DF  Sum of  Mean  F Value  Prob>F 
Squares  Square 
Model  20  28885.8250  1444.2912  156039.91  8  0.0001 
Error  248979  2304.5269  0.00926 
C Total  248999  3 1190.3519 
Root MSE  0.09621  9  R-Square  0.9261 
DEP Mean  0.00548  Adj R-Sq  0.9261 
C.V.  1755.3217 
Variable  Parameter  Standard  T for HO:  Prob>(T( 






















Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Loan Sales, HLT Sample 
A.  Tobit Results 
Noncensored Values = 25,8 12 
Left Censored Values = 45,886 
Observations with Missing Values = 22,988 
Log Likelihood for Normal 434.14330438 

























Loan Sales, HLT Sample (continued) 
B.  Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Source  DF  Sum of  Mean  F Value  Prob>F 
Squares  Square 
Model  21  20.16675  0.96032  225.663  0.0001 
Error  71676  305.02061  0.00426 
C Total  71697  325.18736 
Root MSE  0.06523  R-Square  0.0620 
DEP Mean  0.00676  Adj R-Sq  0.0617 
C.V.  964.32895 
Variable  Parameter  Standard  T for HO:  ProbBlTI 























Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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Loan Purchases, HLT Sample 
A.  Tobit Results 
Noncensored Values = 22,098 
Left Censored Values = 49,600 
Observations with Missing Values = 22,988 
Log Likelihood for Normal 9632.9548943 



























Loan Sales, HLT Sample (continued) 
B.  Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Source  DF  Sum of  Mean  F Value  Prob>F 
Squares  Square 
Model  22  3.03815  0.13810  121.918  0.0001 
Error  71675  81.18683  0.00113 
C Total  7 1697  84.22498 
Root MSE  0.03366  R-Square  0.0361 
DEP Mean  0.00448  Adj R-Sq  0.0358 
C.V.  750.50603 
Variable  Parameter  Standard Error  T for HO:  Prob>lT( 
























Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Loan Sales, with Recession Dummy 
Tobit Results 
Noncensored Values = 182,693 
Left Censored Values = 294,079 
Observations with Missing Values = 4 
Log Likelihood for Normal -130554.25  16 























Source: Authors' calculations. 
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